Posts Tagged ‘psychiatry’

NY Times—U.S. Broadens Bribery Inquiry Into Drug Makers—Federal Prosecutors Investigating Payments Made to Doctors

Tuesday, August 17th, 2010

The New York Times
By Gardiner Harris and Natasha Singer
August 13, 2010

At least a dozen major drug and device makers are under investigation by federal prosecutors and securities regulators in a broadening bribery inquiry into whether the companies made illegal payments to doctors and health officials in foreign countries.

In previous investigations, federal officials have charged that some companies made these kinds of payments to encourage doctors abroad to order or prescribe their products. In the United States, companies routinely hire doctors as consultants to market drugs and devices to their colleagues and other health professionals at medical conventions and small gatherings. Such consulting arrangements are legal in the United States as long as the companies do not pay doctors directly to write prescriptions for their products.

But in much of the rest of the world, doctors are government employees. And even consulting arrangements that would be considered routine in the United States might violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, particularly if the payments are outsize or the arrangements are not disclosed to the governments.

Of even greater concern to prosecutors in the United States are unusually large payments made to foreign doctors who oversee the growing number of clinical trials that drug and device makers conduct abroad, according to Kirk Ogrosky, a former top federal prosecutor who now represents drug and device makers at a Washington law firm.

More than 80 percent of the drugs approved for sale in 2008 involved trials in foreign countries, and 78 percent of all people who participated in clinical trials were enrolled at foreign sites, according to a recent investigation by Daniel R. Levinson, the inspector general of the Department of Health and Human Services. Medical ethicists have long worried that many of these trials are conducted in countries that federal auditors rarely visit and where research controls may be scant.

Now, prosecutors are investigating whether the payments made to doctors who conducted these studies abroad were appropriate. If evidence shows that such payments have influenced the results of some clinical trials, prosecutors will be inspecting the trials closely, Mr. Ogrosky said. An article about the inquiry appeared Friday in The Financial Times.

Last month, a federal drug official reported that he found repeated instances in a landmark clinical trial of Avandia, a controversial diabetes medicine, in which patients taking Avandia appeared to suffer serious heart problems that were not counted in the study’s crucial tally of adverse events. Many of the study’s trial sites were in foreign countries, and the study is a main reason that Avandia remains on the market in the United States. Government officials have not accused GlaxoSmithKline, the trial’s sponsor, of fraud.

“At the Justice Department, investigations that involve allegations of patient harm rise straight to the top and will attract the immediate attention of the F.B.I.,” Mr. Ogrosky said.

Read entire article here:  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/14/health/policy/14drug.html?_r=2&hp

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Now Psychiatrists Want to Repackage Grief as a “mental disorder”

Sunday, August 15th, 2010
The New York Times
by Allen Frances, an emeritus professor and former chairman of psychiatry at Duke University, was the chairman of the task force that created the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.

Illustration credit: Cyprian Koscielniak

A startling suggestion is buried in the fine print describing proposed changes for the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders — perhaps better known as the D.S.M. 5, the book that will set the new boundary between mental disorder and normality. If this suggestion is adopted, many people who experience completely normal grief could be mislabeled as having a psychiatric problem.

Suppose your spouse or child died two weeks ago and now you feel sad, take less interest and pleasure in things, have little appetite or energy, can’t sleep well and don’t feel like going to work. In the proposal for the D.S.M. 5, your condition would be diagnosed as a major depressive disorder.

This would be a wholesale medicalization of normal emotion, and it would result in the overdiagnosis and overtreatment of people who would do just fine if left alone to grieve with family and friends, as people always have. It is also a safe bet that the drug companies would quickly and greedily pounce on the opportunity to mount a marketing blitz targeted to the bereaved and a campaign to “teach” physicians how to treat mourning with a magic pill.

It is not that psychiatrists are in bed with the drug companies, as is often alleged. The proposed change actually grows out of the best of intentions. Researchers point out that, during bereavement, some people develop an enduring case of major depression, and clinicians hope that by identifying such cases early they could reduce the burdens of illness with treatment.

This approach could help those grievers who have severe and potentially dangerous symptoms — for example, delusional guilt over things done to or not done for the deceased, suicidal desires to join the lost loved one, morbid preoccupation with worthlessness, restless agitation, drastic weight loss or a complete inability to function. When things get this bad, the need for a quick diagnosis and immediate treatment is obvious. But people with such symptoms are rare, and their condition can be diagnosed using the criteria for major depression provided in the current manual, the D.S.M. IV.

What is proposed for the D.S.M. 5 is a radical expansion of the boundary for mental illness that would cause psychiatry to intrude in the realm of normal grief. Why is this such a bad idea? First, it would give mentally healthy people the ominous-sounding diagnosis of a major depressive disorder, which in turn could make it harder for them to get a job or health insurance.

Then there would be the expense and the potentially harmful side effects of unnecessary medical treatment. Because almost everyone recovers from grief, given time and support, this treatment would undoubtedly have the highest placebo response rate in medical history. After recovering while taking a useless pill, people would assume it was the drug that made them better and would be reluctant to stop taking it. Consequently, many normal grievers would stay on a useless medication for the long haul, even though it would likely cause them more harm than good.

The bereaved would also lose the benefits that accrue from letting grief take its natural course. What might these be? No one can say exactly. But grieving is an unavoidable part of life — the necessary price we all pay for having the ability to love other people. Our lives consist of a series of attachments and inevitable losses, and evolution has given us the emotional tools to handle both.

Read the rest of this article here http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/opinion/15frances.html

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The Irish Times—All in our heads: Have we taken psychiatry too far?

Friday, August 13th, 2010

by Jason Walsh

Saturday, August 14th

With drafts of the latest edition of the world’s leading psychiatry manual emerging, critics question the growing medicalisation of life’s problems

OVER THE past three decades, unhappiness has been redefined as depression, shyness has been reclassified as social anxiety disorder – even trivial complaints such as fussy eating are now being viewed through a psychiatric prism. Some of this is due to a single book, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual , which critics claim is contributing to the ever-expanding empire of mental health. The next official edition of the DSM will be published in May 2013, but draft versions are currently doing the rounds.

Books abound on the creeping medicalisation of everyday life, television shows like In Treatment and The Sopranos revolve around endless therapy sessions, as do films by the likes of Woody Allen. According to clinical psychotherapist Áine Tubridy: “Many people’s problems have sociological causes, not medical ones. They are problems of living. Society needs to recognise that for many people life is bloody hard,” she says.

But there is growing criticism of the DSM itself and the entire model of diagnoses from within the psychiatric establishment.

Consultant psychiatrist Dr Pat Bracken, clinical director of mental health services in west Cork, is unrelenting in his criticism of over-reliance on the DSM .

“Despite being a primarily American book, the DSM is used universally. The alternative is the International Classification of Diseases published by the World Health Organisation,” he says.

“The DSM really took off in the 1980s, introducing what are called ‘operationalised definitions’. That seemed more scientific – a psychiatrist could say: ‘This person fits these diagnostic criteria.’ It introduced a new way of thinking and a focus on diagnosis.”

The criticism boils down to this: reliance on the DSM reduces psychiatry to little more than a consensus on what kind of behaviour or thoughts are abnormal, not an evidence-based analysis of what is wrong in people’s lives.

Bracken says along with the DSM ’s rise there was a corresponding demise in the use of psychotherapy within the medical profession, even if there was an expansion of private use of therapies and counselling, many of which are of dubious efficacy. For Bracken though, the medicalisation of life’s problems creates the worry that “expert” intervention in private life is often disempowering and misses the point.
“The DSM reflects a growing trend to seek ‘experts’ for problems that once wouldn’t have been the domain of the expert: gambling, social anxiety, marriage problems and so on,” says Bracken. “These were once seen as the vicissitudes of life. The demise of organised religion has also contributed to the growing social demand. The DSM legitimises that process and contributes to it,” he says.

This argument links the medical critique of the DSM back to its social implications. The repercussions of privatised social lives driven by the breakup of traditional sources of solidarity outside the family unit – organised religion, trade unions, political parties and other communal organisations – has left individuals confused, lonely and often frightened and encouraged to seek therapy when in fact the problem is a socio-political one.

What, though, is to be done when a patient arrives at their GP’s surgery in despair?

Niall Crumlish, deputy external affairs and policy director of the College of Psychiatry of Ireland, is a locum consultant psychiatrist at St James’s Hospital in Dublin. While he recognises the limitations of psychiatric diagnosis, a patient who asks for help must be given it, he says.

“There are cases for arguing that we are both over-medicalised and under-medicalised,” he says. “There is a huge number of people presenting to primary care providers [seeking psychiatric help] but there are also many not presenting, people with major depression who are functioning but at a much lower level than they might.

“Without the DSM we’d be losing a basic foundation for what we are doing. There is some validity to diagnosis. There is such a thing as a depressive syndrome that you could produce biologically if you were so minded,” he says.

An article published in the Journal of the American Medical Association this July by two of the DSM ’s authors argued the forthcoming fifth edition should be of interest to all health providers, not just psychiatrists.

The DSM is in part a product of the US psychiatric establishment being rocked in the 1960s. David Rosenhan, a follower of the controversial Scottish “anti-psychiatrist” Dr RD Laing, virtually smashed psychoanalysis as it was practised in America almost single handedly.

Rosenhan and some colleagues presented themselves at several mental hospitals claiming to have a sole auditory hallucination – a voice in their heads saying “thud” – and then behaved normally. They were all diagnosed with a variety of mental illnesses: schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis. They were eventually released, months later, when they “admitted” they were mentally ill and pretended to get better, demonstrating – they said – that psychiatrists were unable to distinguish between the sane and the insane.

The experiment’s objective wasn’t to prove the obvious point that it is possible to pretend to be mentally ill. Instead it demonstrated that, once admitted, all behaviour by patients is pathologised and ordinary actions were taken as evidence of illness. This rocked the establishment and one hospital challenged Rosenhan to do it again. He agreed and the hospital soon declared it had discovered 41 fakes. Rosenhan then announced he had sent no one for the second experiment.

According to Bracken, this body blow coincided with the increasing use of drug treatment for illnesses: “In the 1950s and 1960s, psychoanalysis was very dominant. Then you had a rejection of that and a move toward the DSM and the psychopharmacology revolution. “Today, the efficacy of the drugs is being called into question,” he says.

By moving away from endless psychoanalysis the diagnostic model favoured by the DSM , particularly from the 1980 third edition onwards, seemed to offer an answer to the problem. Patients symptoms were analysed on a more or less statistical basis and those who fit a specified pattern were declared to have the relevant condition.

Although it has since spread worldwide, the American bias of the DSM is clear: given that unhappiness is not covered by health insurance policies but major depression is, a massive expansion of diagnoses of depression and related illnesses is unsurprising. However, DSM critics argue the book is part of a wider reshaping of our understanding of what it is to be human, not simply a licence to malinger but pathologising everyday experiences.

Read the rest of this article here: http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/weekend/2010/0814/1224276782556.html

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So much for psychiatry’s claim mental disorders are ‘medical conditions’—they’re now diagnosing patients by video uploads

Friday, August 6th, 2010

We would like to point out something quite obvious regarding this latest psychiatric evaluation tool;  Psychiatrists are forever claiming that mental “disorders” are on par with real physical illness—That ADHD, Bipolar Disorder,  Obsessive Compulsive disorder and the myriad of DSM diagnoses are the same as real medical conditions like cancer or diabetes.  Well,  try and imagine a doctor diagnosing a patient with cancer via a videotaped interview.  Or diabetes.     Yet the “mental illness is the same as physical illness” is the PR line used by psycho/pharma to obtain billions in government funding.     And that’s why mandating mental health parity (equal insurance coverage for mental disorders as that which is covered for real physical illness/disease)  is a joke.  Its not about parity for people with “mental illness” its about a blank check for Psycho/Pharma to bill insurance.

PhysOrg.com
August 6, 2010

Psychiatrists can accurately assess a patient’s mental health by viewing videotaped interviews that are sent to them for consultation and treatment recommendations, according to a new study by researchers at the UC Davis School of Medicine.

The approach, called asynchronous telepsychiatry, uses store-and-forward technology, in which medical information is retrieved, stored and transmitted for later review using e-mail or Web applications. It has been used extensively for specialties like dermatology, with photos of skin conditions sent to dermatologists, or x-rays sent to radiologists for assessment.

However, the current study is the first to examine store-and-forward technology for psychiatry, said Peter Yellowlees, professor of psychiatry and behavioral sciences and the study’s lead author. “A Feasibility Study of the Use of Asynchronous Telepsychiatry for Psychiatric Consultations” is published in the August issue of the journal Psychiatric Services.

“We’ve demonstrated that this approach is feasible and very efficient,” said Yellowlees, who is an internationally recognized expert in telepsychiatry. “Using store-and-forward technology allows us to provide opinions to primary-care doctors much more quickly than would usually be the case.”

The researchers conducted the study to determine the effectiveness of asynchronous telepsychiatry for patients in Tulare County, a rural county in California’s San Joaquin Valley. Sixty male and female patients between the ages of 27 and 64 who had mostly mild-to-moderate mental-health disorders were included in the study.

Researcher Alberto Odor, associate adjunct professor of anesthesiology and , conducted 20- to 30-minute structured videotaped interviews at a community-based primary-care clinic. The videos were then uploaded to UC Davis’ specially designed Web-based telepsychiatry consultation record. Yellowlees and Donald Hilty, professor of psychiatry and behavioral sciences, reviewed the videotapes and provided psychiatric evaluations to the patients’ community-based primary-care physicians.

Fifty-one percent of patients received diagnoses of mood disorders, 19 percent received diagnoses of substance use disorders, 32 percent received diagnoses of anxiety disorders and 5 percent received other diagnoses — including kleptomania, schizophrenia and parasomnia. Five patients also were diagnosed with disorders such as borderline personality disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder or personality disorder. Some of the individuals had multiple diagnoses.

Read entire article:  http://www.physorg.com/news200305373.html

Psychiatrists can accurately assess a patient’s mental health by viewing videotaped interviews that are sent to them for consultation and treatment recommendations, according to a new study by researchers at the UC Davis School of Medicine.

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LewRockwell.com—No Excuses:The Reality Cure of Thomas Szasz—Szasz has been, for over 50 years, the gadfly of psychiatry

Wednesday, August 4th, 2010

LewRockwell.com
By Phil Barker and Poppy Buchanan-Barker
August 4, 2010

And you thought Tom Szasz was yesterday’s hero? This paper brings us up to date.

Future historians may well cast Thomas Szasz as an intrepid campaigner for the blindingly obvious: people do not have “mental illnesses” but experience a wide range of moral, interpersonal, social and political “problems in living.” All such problems concern, or have an impact on, our sense of who and what we are and could just as easily be called spiritual crises. However, despite his prodigious scholarly output, Szasz might well be written out of history, as punishment for his single-handed and persistent exposure of the greatest hoax of the modern age – the construction of the “myth of mental illness” and psychiatry’s ludicrous attempts to “treat” it.

In the best Socratic tradition Szasz has been, for over 50 years, the gadfly of psychiatry. In his classic book, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct (Szasz, 1961), he contended that, contrary to the professional and public opinion of the time (the late 1950s) the mind – an abstract concept – could only be considered “sick” in the same sense that a joke or a building might similarly be described. This mind metaphor functions as a powerful myth, like many fictions, offering comfort to all who embrace the idea as a way of explaining the “inexplicable.”

At the end of the 20th century religion, especially Christianity, was furiously debunked by radical secularists like Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett and Christopher Hitchens. They exposed not just its mythical nature but the harm and injustice associated with its practice down the ages. Ironically, their glaring sin of omission was to ignore psychiatry – by far the most potent and influential religion of the past two hundred years.

Psychiatrists might feign offense at their portrayal as “high priests,” believing that they offer a complex and compassionate form of psychological medicine, worshipping at the same altar as scientists like Dawkins. Historically, the facts tell a very different story, as Szasz’s works have vividly illustrated.

Traditional religions can hold sway over large sections of any population, and may be considered a force for good or evil. However, such “myths” are, at the very least, embraced by the faithful; who gain socially, culturally or spiritually from their allegiance; and are free to rejoin secular society whenever they wish. The same could never be said of “psychiatric patients.” The open secret of the 20th century was that modern psychiatry became a “church” founded on hocus-pocus masquerading as science, and promoted a range of means of detaining and restraining its “patient” flock. Today, as psychiatry rebrands itself as a branch of neuroscience, it seeks to colonize “developing nations,” despite its near-bankrupt status in its Western world of origin. Parallels with the Christian missionaries seem wholly apposite.

Over the past 60 years Thomas Szasz has published over 30 books and around 700 papers and articles, all focused on exposing the logical weaknesses of psychiatric thought, and the moral bankruptcy of its practice. Heidegger proposed that every great thinker thinks but one thought. Szasz’s singular, original thought concerns the moral bankruptcy of expecting (far less forcing) people to see psychiatrists; to be admitted to so-called “mental hospitals”; to take psychiatric drugs; and otherwise to comply with the capricious fashions of psychiatric religion. His diverse and remarkably accessible writings around this single proposition have led many to view him as the foremost, contemporary moral and existential philosopher of psychiatry and psychotherapy: the psychiatric equivalent of the boy obligated to point out the Emperor’s nakedness. In his 90th year, the uncompromising fury of Szasz’s scholarship shows no sign of waning as three of his latest books attest.

Coercion as Cure (Szasz 2007) has a “classic” feel providing, as its subtitle makes clear, a much-needed “critical history of psychiatry.” Szasz acknowledges that, from his first day in medical school in the early 1940s, his understanding of the physician’s role was to try to relieve the suffering of individuals who asked for, and accepted, medical help. He quickly formed the view that psychiatrists were committing a grave moral wrong by imprisoning and coercing people who neither sought nor wanted their “help.” This simple, yet profoundly humanist view became, and remains, his raison d’être.

Read entire article here:  http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig10/szasz5.1.1.html

Dr. Thomas Szasz is also the co-founder of CCHR.  For more on Thomas Szasz, including his CV, quotes, video, accolades and his relationship with CCHR, click here:  http://www.cchrint.org/about-us/co-founder-dr-thomas-szasz/

And you thought Tom Szasz was yesterday’s hero? This paper brings us up to date.

Future historians may well cast Thomas Szasz as an intrepid campaigner for the blindingly obvious: people do not have “mental illnesses” but experience a wide range of moral, interpersonal, social and political “problems in living.” All such problems concern, or have an impact on, our sense of who and what we are and could just as easily be called spiritual crises. However, despite his prodigious scholarly output, Szasz might well be written out of history, as punishment for his single-handed and persistent exposure of the greatest hoax of the modern age – the construction of the “myth of mental illness” and psychiatry’s ludicrous attempts to “treat” it.

In the best Socratic tradition Szasz has been, for over 50 years, the gadfly of psychiatry. In his classic book, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct (Szasz, 1961), he contended that, contrary to the professional and public opinion of the time (the late 1950s) the mind – an abstract concept – could only be considered “sick” in the same sense that a joke or a building might similarly be described. This mind metaphor functions as a powerful myth, like many fictions, offering comfort to all who embrace the idea as a way of explaining the “inexplicable.”

At the end of the 20th century religion, especially Christianity, was furiously debunked by radical secularists like Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett and Christopher Hitchens. They exposed not just its mythical nature but the harm and injustice associated with its practice down the ages. Ironically, their glaring sin of omission was to ignore psychiatry – by far the most potent and influential religion of the past two hundred years.

Psychiatrists might feign offense at their portrayal as “high priests,” believing that they offer a complex and compassionate form of psychological medicine, worshipping at the same altar as scientists like Dawkins. Historically, the facts tell a very different story, as Szasz’s works have vividly illustrated.

Traditional religions can hold sway over large sections of any population, and may be considered a force for good or evil. However, such “myths” are, at the very least, embraced by the faithful; who gain socially, culturally or spiritually from their allegiance; and are free to rejoin secular society whenever they wish. The same could never be said of “psychiatric patients.” The open secret of the 20th century was that modern psychiatry became a “church” founded on hocus-pocus masquerading as science, and promoted a range of means of detaining and restraining its “patient” flock. Today, as psychiatry rebrands itself as a branch of neuroscience, it seeks to colonize “developing nations,” despite its near-bankrupt status in its Western world of origin. Parallels with the Christian missionaries seem wholly apposite.

Over the past 60 years Thomas Szasz has published over 30 books and around 700 papers and articles, all focused on exposing the logical weaknesses of psychiatric thought, and the moral bankruptcy of its practice. Heidegger proposed that every great thinker thinks but one thought. Szasz’s singular, original thought concerns the moral bankruptcy of expecting (far less forcing) people to see psychiatrists; to be admitted to so-called “mental hospitals”; to take psychiatric drugs; and otherwise to comply with the capricious fashions of psychiatric religion. His diverse and remarkably accessible writings around this single proposition have led many to view him as the foremost, contemporary moral and existential philosopher of psychiatry and psychotherapy: the psychiatric equivalent of the boy obligated to point out the Emperor’s nakedness. In his 90th year, the uncompromising fury of Szasz’s scholarship shows no sign of waning as three of his latest books attest.

Coercion as Cure (Szasz 2007) has a “classic” feel providing, as its subtitle makes clear, a much-needed “critical history of psychiatry.” Szasz acknowledges that, from his first day in medical school in the early 1940s, his understanding of the physician’s role was to try to relieve the suffering of individuals who asked for, and accepted, medical help. He quickly formed the view that psychiatrists were committing a grave moral wrong by imprisoning and coercing people who neither sought nor wanted their “help.” This simple, yet profoundly humanist view became, and remains, his raison d’être.

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The Psychologist, UK: Madness, Myth and Medicine—the continuing relevance of Thomas Szasz, now in his 91st year

Monday, August 2nd, 2010

The Psychologist

by Ron Roberts

Only after we abandon the pretense that mind is brain and that mental disease is brain disease can we begin the honest study of human behaviour and the means people use to help themselves and others cope with the demands of living (Szasz, 2007a, p.149).

Fifty years ago American Psychologist published a seminal article by the Hungarian-born psychoanalyst and psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, “The myth of mental illness” (Szasz, 1960). The thesis was elaborated at length in a book of the same name a year later (Szasz, 1961).

As the decade got into full swing, Szasz’s critique of psychiatric theory and practice was herded into the same conceptual basket as the musings of Scottish psychiatrist R.D. Laing, and his erstwhile friend and collaborator David Cooper. The quite different ideas of these men came to be bracketed inappropriately under the rubric of “anti-psychiatry”—an expression coined by Cooper though disclaimed by Laing and rejected outright by Szasz.

Since then biological psychiatry has developed a stranglehold on research, teaching and practice in the field of “mental health,” and Szasz’s opposition to psychiatry and the basis for it has been mislocated in the art and culture of the day, its relevance for today denied. Szasz’s view has become viewed by many as a supposed child of its time—a component in the social manufacture of the so-called anti-establishment Swinging Sixties. To let such misapprehension pass unchallenged into the history of the behavioural sciences would be a serious error, and Szasz for his part has constantly endeavoured to set the record straight.

First it must be said that Szasz’s insights into the shortcomings of conventional psychiatry pre-date the 1960s by some considerable margin. In a brief autobiographical sketch Szasz makes clear that the absurdity of psychiatric fictions had dawned on him long before Fellini’s masterpiece was highlighting the shallowness of La Dolce Vita: “Everything I had learned and thought about mental illness, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis—from my teenage years, through medical school, and my psychiatric and psychoanalytic training—confirmed my view that mental illness is a fiction; that psychiatry, resting on force and fraud is social control, and that psychoanalysis—properly conceived—has nothing to do with illness or medicine or treatment.” (2004, p.22)

Szasz graduated in medicine in 1944, having migrated to the US from his native Hungary in 1938, a fugitive from the looming menace of Nazism. He undertook a psychiatric residency and trained in psychoanalysis. The appeal of psychoanalysis, besides its intellectual and interpersonal attractions, lay in its ostensibly consensual and contractual nature. Less well known than his other works, his dissection of power in psychoanalytic relationships—published as The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (Szasz, 1965)—is central to his thinking and stands complementary to the assertions that mental illness is a myth. In this Szasz effectively provides a practical guide on how to ensure a level playing field in psychotherapeutic relationships, to the benefit of both parties. He is honest and open enough to explicitly explore the role that money may play in distorting therapeutic means and ends. As such, it not only stands the test of time but stands squarely against the numerous vested interests, both pharmaceutical-financial and professional, which dominate the mental health industry past and present

Anti-psychiatry or pro-consent?
Szasz is not “anti”-psychiatry. He advocates the right to agree consensual contractual relations of any kind, including consensual psychiatry if that is what suitably informed people want. He has proposed, for example, the use of advanced psychiatric directives whereby people could agree to accept or refuse specific interventions to be made “on their behalf” in the event of their becoming extremely distressed and “irrational” in future. Such ideas have unfortunately been rejected outright by leading figures in both psychiatry and medical ethics, and accordingly Szasz sees little possibility of any kind of consensual psychiatry until the use of coercion, whether explicit or tacit, is relinquished.

As psychiatry continues to function for the most part as an extension of the criminal justice system, Szasz asserts that psychiatry in its current form must be abolished. This would require a concerted challenge to its support structures, premised as they are on the notions of behaviour as disease, the fear of dangerousness and the necessity for medical treatment under the guise of protecting the individual from his or herself. The championing of the latter notion in particular owes much to an ignorance of its origins. A careful reading of Szasz’s historical analysis of the origins of the insanity defence in 17th-century England goes some way to clarifying where behavioural scientists got the idea from that people of “unsound mind” were not responsible for their actions and could not be held accountable for them. In Coercion as Cure, he writes

With suicide defined as a species of murder, the persons sitting in judgment of self killers had the duty to punish them. Since punishing suicide required doing injustice to innocent parties… the wives and minor children of the deceased—eventually the task proved to be an intolerable burden. In the seventeenth century, men sitting on coroners’ juries began to recoil against desecrating the corpse and dispossessing the suicide’s dependants of their means of support. However, their religious beliefs precluded repeal of the laws punishing the crime. Their only recourse was to evade the laws; The doctrine that the self-slayer is non compos mentis and hence not responsible for his act accomplished this task (Szasz, 2007a, p.99)

And so a social practice became reified into an imaginary biological disease process ravaging through the brains of its unfortunate victims, necessitating psychiatric intervention!

The label of “anti-psychiatry” that continues to be attached to Szasz is one which he has been at pains to condemn (Szasz, 2009), used as it is to stultify and nullify any criticism of contemporary psychiatry. While Laing saw himself as “essentially on the same side” as Szasz (Mullan, 1995, p.202), Szasz sees considerable distance between them, for a number of reasons. Perhaps at the forefront of these Laing was known to have forcibly drugged one of his patients (Szasz, 2008) and for all his eloquence and insight into human misery his writings do not in principle condemn the forced treatment or incarceration of people against their will on psychiatric grounds. Finally whilst The Divided Self (Laing, 1960) and Sanity Madness and the Family (Laing & Esterson, 1964) amongst other outpourings proclaimed the intelligibility of going mad within a human rather than biological framework, Laing did not reject outright the notion of mental illness, which in Szasz’s view remains at best a metaphor.

Szasz has throughout his career stood firmly to his principles and steadfastly eschewed psychiatric practice in an environment where people have been deprived of their liberty. He has on occasion appeared in court both to represent individuals deprived of their liberty and to uphold the principle of criminal responsibility in murder cases where those accused have sought to evade it through the insanity defence (see Szasz, 2007b, chapter 13 in particular). Such consistent challenges to institutional psychiatry have been made at some professional cost. Szasz has not simply been the recipient of fierce criticism from the psychiatric fraternity, who feel betrayed by his actions, but has also endured attempts to limit his academic freedom. In the aftermath of the publication of The Myth of Mental Illness, for example, attempts were made to ban him from teaching at the state hospital medical school—citing his beliefs as “proof” of his “incompetence as a psychiatrist” (Schaler, 2004, p.xix).

Some confusion about Szasz’s work has arisen through the quite different political cultures within which it is interpreted, even by those who oppose institutional psychiatry in its current incarnation. His work has been claimed and repudiated by those on both the “left” and “right”—deemed a liberal in some quarters and a fascist in others—with the claims and counterclaims rooted in the predilections of the critics for different configurations of state power. European intellectual tradition on the left, for example, clings to a belief and a desire that state power can be harnessed for the good. This means that while Szasz’s attacks on psychiatric authority are applauded, his admonitions against the “therapeutic state” (Szasz, 2001, 2002), with its merging of psychiatric and state power on the one hand and private and public health on the other, are glossed over. In truth, if such a thing can be said, Szasz’s ideas belong to neither the right nor the left. His work challenges and questions all operations of organised power from the state downwards, as long as they are used to crush and oppress human freedom. His work implies unanswered questions concerning theforms of community and social organisation which people can harness for the individual and common good in order to enable them to deal elegantly with the insatiable demands of living.

Addendum
While preparing this article I encountered Philippe Petit’s (2002) wondrous account of his high-wire walk across the twin towers of the World Trade Center in 1974. Immediately after performing his “artistic crime of the century” Petit was arrested and subject to psychiatric examination. Petit was judged to be sane, but the outcome of the psychiatric interview is less revealing than the fact that psychiatrists were willing to play their part in a pseudo-medical intervention provoked by nothing more than social rule breaking of the highest imaginative order. It struck me that Petit—an imaginative, unusual and beguiling figure—exemplifies much that modern psychiatry stands in antipathy to. Petit cares not for the rules and regulations that structure and govern the lives of citizens and lives, in his terms, only to dream “projects that ripen in the clouds”(Petit, 2002, p.6). There can be little doubt that psychiatry is an enterprise that is engineered to destroy these—that it cannot tolerate idiosyncrasies of thought, whether grandiose or mundane. Petit succeeded in his outlandish and highly improbable quest—but why should one have to achieve outlandish success to be embraced by society and enjoy the right to pop one’s head in the clouds or spend the “afternoons in treetops”? Szasz’s efforts over the years can be seen in many lights, but without doubt he has toiled on behalf of the dream of human accountability and responsibility, for the freedom to be different and to take charge of one’s life, free from the machinations of state sponsored psychiatric interference.

Read the article here:  http://www.centerforindependentthought.org/Psychologist_article.html

Dr. Thomas Szasz is also the co-founder of CCHR.  For more on Thomas Szasz, including his CV, quotes, video, accolades and his relationship with CCHR, click here:

http://www.cchrint.org/about-us/co-founder-dr-thomas-szasz/


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Pharmaceutical Industry and Psychiatry—Conjoined Twins Joined at the Wallet, by former Pharma rep turned whistleblower

Friday, July 30th, 2010

OpEdNews
By K. L. Carlson
July 30, 2010

“Unlimited spending! Schedule all the programs you can.” That was the management directive announced at the regional business meeting I attended when I first became a pharmaceutical rep. When I heard the announcement I felt like I was on an Enron train that was roaring down the tracks, and the company expected everyone to be on board. The company was giving its sales force unlimited funds to hire physicians as paid speakers, sometimes to influence other physicians to prescribe the company’s drugs, at other times to simply financially reward physicians who wrote high volumes of prescriptions every month for the company’s drugs.

Former Merck regional sales manager, Gene Carbona, told the New York Times that the only thing the company considered when selecting physicians to provide presentations was “the volume or potential volume of prescribing that the doctor could do.” This is true of all pharmaceutical companies. According to The Wall Street Journal (August 31, 2009), Eli Lilly alone paid physicians $22 million dollars in just the first quarter of 2009.

The higher a physician is on the influential ladder, the greater the financial rewards to be reaped. Pharmaceutical companies pay influential leaders who can sway public opinion and influence research. And the area of medicine receiving the greatest amount of pharmaceutical money is psychiatry. The American Psychiatric Association (APA) is the most drug industry financially supported medical association. In July 2008, Senator Charles Grassley’s demands that the APA provide an accounting of its finances revealed that in 2006 the pharmaceutical industry accounted for about 30 percent of the APA’s financing; more than $20 million dollars.

Read entire article here:  http://www.opednews.com/articles/Pharmaceutical-Industry-an-by-K-L-Carlson-100727-454.html

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Science Mag—This Is Your Brain Off Drugs:Why Pharma May Be Cooling on Psychiatry Drugs—no pathology for mental ‘disease’

Wednesday, July 28th, 2010

Though this article includes some scientific/medical terminology, the  significance of what the neurologist is describing is extremely relevant:  Unlike regular “diseases” there is no clear pathology for psychiatric disorders.   See this previous blog/news entry by CCHR on this same subject: Wake Up FDA—Even Drug Giants Are Admitting No Lab Tests Exist To Prove If Antidepressants Work  http://www.cchrint.org/2010/02/05/wake-up-fda%E2%80%94even-drug-giants-are-admitting-no-lab-tests-exist-to-prove-if-antidepressants-work/

ScienceMag.com

by Greg Miller, July 28, 2010

Earlier this year, pharmaceutical giant AstraZeneca announced it was ceasing drug-discovery research for psychiatric disorders such as depression and schizophrenia. The move, along with cutbacks at other companies, has raised concerns about where the next generation of neuropsychiatric drugs will come from—see this Friday’s issue of Science for a feature article exploring this topic.

Yesterday, ScienceInsider spoke with neuroscientist Menelas Pangalos, who in May took over as AstraZeneca’s head of drug-discovery research and early development. His comments have been edited for brevity.

Q: What do the recent changes mean for neuroscience research at AstraZeneca?

M.P.: Basically, from a research perspective, we’re pulling out of the psychiatry space. We’re still very much focused on neurology, so Alzheimer’s disease, pain, cognition, … those areas are still very active.

Q: What makes research on psychiatric drugs less attractive?

M.P.: Our understanding of disease pathophysiology is still relatively in its infancy.

These are complex and heterogeneous disorders. Also, the size and robustness of the clinical trials made it a less attractive area for us to be in compared to other areas we were working in. There has to be a much better alignment between preclinical and clinical work.

Q: How so?

M.P.: In neurology, if you take stroke as an example, preclinical models of stroke tend to be occlusion of the middle cerebral artery, which causes ischemic damage in the brain of a rodent or nonhuman primate that mirrors fairly well what happens in the human situation.

When you start getting into psychiatry, we have tail suspension assays, we have forced swim assays, we have learned helplessness assays … none of which have been developed through a detailed understanding of the pathophysiology. [In these tests, researchers measure how long it takes a rodent to stop struggling after being suspended by its tail or placed in a pool of liquid; giving up is presumed to be a rodent version of despair.]

Read the entire article here:  http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2010/07/this-is-your-brain-off-drugs-why.html


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The BBC—new report challenges psychiatry’s billing bible, the DSM—”Mental Health: Are we all sick now?”

Wednesday, July 28th, 2010

BBC News
By Philippa Roxby
July 28, 2010

Diagnosing psychiatric illness has always been controversial, mental health experts say. Now some are worried that a new draft of the diagnostic ‘bible’ for mental health medicine could result in almost everyone being diagnosed with a mental condition.

The diagnostic ‘bible’ in question is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the American Psychiatric Association.

The US manual is used worldwide as a basis for diagnosis, research and medical education.

Its forthcoming fifth edition – known in the profession as as DSM-5 – is set to contain a range of new diagnoses, including conditions such as “mixed anxiety depression, psychosis risk syndrome and temper dysregulation disorder”, as well as the more mundane binge eating.

The danger, say experts writing in a special issue of the Journal of Mental Health, is that there has not been enough research to back up these changes.

Even the smallest shift in how to define something like depression could have huge implications.

Self-fulfilling

Dr Felicity Callard, senior research fellow at the Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, says it is crucial to understand what happens when people are over-diagnosed.

“There are very big potential implications on how people, particularly adolescents, respond to being told they have a mental illness. It’s likely there will be harmful consequences,” she said.

She cites the “at risk psychosis syndrome” diagnosis as an example of a label which is given to young people who ‘might’ have psychosis – characterised by abrupt changes in personality. It is a diagnosis of something which could result in a disorder, but only potentially. That can have complicated effects, she says.

“Imagine a young person being told that they are “at risk” of developing a mental illness. How would that affect that individual’s behaviour? Could it lead to increased stigma or even discrimination? And how might it affect the parents and family of that person too?”

Jerome Wakefield of New York University’s Department of Psychiatry writes: “One of the most frightening scenarios is the potential for medicating people – particularly children – who haven’t yet shown any signs of illness in a bid to ‘treat’ them.”

These concerns are shared by a number of clinical experts in the Journal of Mental Health.

Read entire article here:  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-10787342

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The New American—Psychiatry’s Brave New World

Friday, July 23rd, 2010

The New American
By Beverly K. Eakman
July 22, 2010

After some 40 years of psychiatry-based “parenting,” free societies are experiencing behaviors by out-of-control children virtually unknown in the 1950s — first-graders biting and kicking their teachers; adolescents blowing away their classmates; pre-teens cursing, spitting, and vandalizing while adults look on. Advocates for a Nanny State see all this as a wedge to further their controlling agenda. Anyone curious as to where we’re headed need look no further than the United Kingdom’s now-institutionalized ASBO legislation.

In July 1998, the U.K.’s Crime and Disorder Act enacted the “Anti-Social Behaviour Orders” (ASBOs) to tackle disagreeable and disruptive acts. ASBOs are court-ordered restrictions on “unsociable conduct” aimed at youngsters aged 10 or over. Breaching an ASBO is a criminal offense.

Eight years into the legislation, some 12,675 ASBOs had been issued. Nearly 2,000 youngsters, aged 10 to 17, were jailed by 2007 for an average of six months each for breaching ASBOs. Even that was not enough. According to Mail Online, May 27, 2007 (“Revealed: Blair’s secret stalker squad”), the government attempted to widen the definition of “mental disorder” so that the right not to be detained in a psychiatric facility based on cultural, political, or religious beliefs would be forfeited.

By 2007, Britain had gone a long way to becoming the ultimate modern police state. The nation had more than 20 percent of the world’s CCTV cameras incorporating automatic number-plate recognition, facial recognition and “suspicious behavior recognition” software, which analyzes clusters and movements in search of “behavioral oddities.” Some £1 million was allocated for hidden loudspeakers so that camera operators could issue orders, very loudly, to anyone seen littering or committing other “gotcha crimes” (petty rules that are easier to enforce than dangerous acts). A competition was even launched in schools to find “socially conscious” children who might be used for voice-overs to “remind adults to act responsibly on our streets,” according to the U.K.’s Home Office.

“Emotional literacy” classes were introduced in schools to teach children how to manage anger and jealousy and develop empathy and self-motivation. This move mirrors the touchy-feely curricular trends of American classrooms — “conflict resolution,” “survival skills,” “safe sex” and “self-esteem.”

Read entire article:  http://thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/health-care/4112-psychiatrys-brave-new-world

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